The federalist controversy

Despite much acrimony, there is ample ground for negotiation and compromise between the views of the two SRC factions THE two reports released by the State Restructuring Commission (SRC) are expressions of two visions for Nepal’s future. The first report, which envisages 11 provinces and was voted for by a majority of SRC members, is driven by the urge to provide political power to groups that have been historically underrepresented by the state. As such, it seeks to accord as much power as possible to the provinces. The second report, which envisages six provinces and was voted for by a minority in the SRC, is concerned about the erosion of central power. There has been much controversy over the two reports. In particular, the proponents of the latter have strongly criticised the former for being against democratic values and attempting to instigate conflict between various groups. A closer look at the disputed provisions reveals, however, that the chasm between the two sides need not be as deep as it is at the moment; that there is in fact much ground for compromise between the two sides. First, whereas both of the reports envisage a three-tier federal structure, the majority report states that the third (local) tier of governance should fall under the control of the provincial administration. The majority SRC faction wants this provision, as it is fearful of central interference in the affairs of the state. The minority report is reluctant to make this qualification and simply states that there will be three tiers of governance in the country. It has criticised the majority for seeking to establish a “dictatorship” of sorts of the provincial administration over the local bodies. And it seems to envisage a situation where local bodies are run through directions and funds given from the centre; where local bodies will have the right to appeal to the central government over the heads of those in the provincial administration. In reality, both of these sides are pursuing extreme claims. Local government cannot remain the preserve of either the central or provincial governments. Given the fact that provinces will continue to a great extent to be dependent on transfers from the centre, their local bodies will of necessity be receptive to central influence. It also makes sense for a central body to devise broad policies for local bodies. On the other hand, it is also absurd for local bodies to be controlled directly from the centre. The provincial administration will be closer to them and will understand their needs better. It is clear from the reports of the SRC that the division of powers between the centre and provinces when it comes to local bodies has not been considered in adequate detail. Second, the minority group of he SRC has criticised the majority group for allowing for priority rights (agradhikar) in the provinces. This, the minority claims, is against the rights of certain communities. What has gone unmentioned, however, is that the majority proposal in fact represents a significant compromise from what the Maoists and Madhesi parties had been demanding earlier. The CA State Restructuring Committee, under the influence of these parties, had envisaged a situation where the dominant community in each region would have the right to rule for two terms. The majority faction desires no such thing at the provincial level. It envisages “prior rights” to rule only at the level of special areas (regions of subautonomy within provinces for particularly marginalised groups), and that too for only a single term. This is considerably less threatening to the nationally dominant communities. Further, to dismiss this provision as “a threat to democracy” is simplistic. All across South Asia, g ov e r nments have realised the need to protect group rights as well as those of individuals. Reservations are a policy mechanism through which group rights are protected, and agradhikar too is such a policy measure. Moreover, reservations are now here to stay. The provision for agradhikar as envisaged in the SRC report is so weak that it unlikely to become entrenched. Third, the majority report states that each province will have the right to selfdetermination. The proponents of the minority faction remain staunchly against this, claiming that this will lead to the fragmentation of the country. In the popular press, the right to self-determination has been interpreted as the right of provinces to secede. But the reports of the SRC, as well as the previous CA State Restructuring Committee, do not mean this at all. The right to selfdetermination is interpreted in these reports as the right of Madhesi, Janajati and Dalit groups to work with and develop their own languages and cultures, to enjoy rights over the natural resources in the regions. While some such provisions are necessary to empower these communities, it clearly will not do to give dominant groups within provinces the right to monopolise the resources of their province. The precise nature of these rights remains to be negotiated. There is however little cause to fear that something as drastic as secession will arise as a result of this provision. Fourth, the most controversial decision of the majority faction of the SRC has been its model of 11 states. In particular, there has been an outcry against the provision in the majority report for two adjacent states in the Tarai that run from the east of the country to the west, thus possessing a monopoly over access to India. This provision is indeed problematic. Access to India is extremely important to Nepal. To allow only two provinces access to it means to allow them to hold the centre or the rest of the country hostage to their whims when they desire it by, for example, not allowing good to be transported through their regions. This is a recipe for conflict. On the other hand, the six state proposal of the minority factions is also problematic. Despite paying lip service to the notion that provinces will be formed according to identity and capacity, the map it has proposed distinctly reveals an attempt to undermine the role of identity. As has been said many times before, the assertion of identity by previously marginalised groups has been central to the demands of federalism. The task is to negotiate identity demands in a way that accords them recognition while seeking to minimise the possibility of future conflict between province and state, between different identity groups. It is absurd to seek to do away with identity demands altogether. There is little cause to fear that something as drastic as secession will arise as a result of the right to self-determination